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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze empirically if the effect of social cohesion on economic growth 
is conditioned by country size. Two groups of countries, large and small, were set up, and by using the 
System-GMM estimator and panel data in a 5-year rolling window, from 1970 to 2010, the impact of 
civil war and ethnic tension on growth rate of GDP per capita of the two groups of states was 
estimated. Also, the difference between small and large states in terms of the impact of civil war and 
ethnic tension on β-convergence rate was analyzed. We conclude that the effects of social cohesion 
(measured by civil war) in economic growth and in β-convergence rate are influenced by country size, 
and the positive effect is higher in small states. 
JEL classification: O47, O57 
Keywords: Country Size, Small States, Social Cohesion and Economic Growth. 
 
1 – INTRODUCTION  
In recent decades several researches about small states have been published. Most of 
these studies focused on the impact of reduced dimension (land area, population or GDP) in 
growth and economic development (Armstrong et al., 1998; Briguglio, 1998; Easterly and 
Kraay, 2000). One of the first debates with a specific focus on issues concerning small states 
occurred in 1962 when the Institute of Commonwealth Studies initiated a series of seminars at 
the University of London. These seminars took place at regular intervals over a period of two 
years and they introduced more than 20 works related to the common problems faced by 
small states (Lockhart, 1993). These works were later edited by Benedict (1967) in his book 
Problems of Smaller Territories, constituting one of the first works about small states.  
Many theoretical studies argue that small states compared to large states are 
disadvantaged due to the negative effect of small size on the economic growth process. 
Particular characteristics of small states include: small market size, small population, 
dependence on a limited export market and exported products and scarcity of natural 
resources. But, paradoxically, many small states have a high level of economic growth and 
they are part of the group of countries with the highest GDP per capita worldwide. Several 
authors explain the success of small countries by the strong social cohesion. Thus, we intend 
to analyze whether social cohesion impacts on economic growth is statistically different 
between small and large countries.  
                                                            
a Student in the PhD Programme in Economics at University of Coimbra, Faculty of Economics and University 
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The social cohesion or lack of social cohesion has influenced history of many countries 
and with impact on economic performance. The latest example of country division due to 
ethnic diversity is South Sudan's independence from Sudan in July 2011. We used civil war 
and ethnic tension to estimate the impact of the social cohesion on growth rate of GDP per 
capita. Also, the difference of social cohesion impacts between small and large states was 
analysed in terms of the effects on β-convergence rate.  
In our analysis, we first use the statistical technique of cluster analysis to constitute two 
groups of countries, small and large, based on the size of the land area and population. 
Subsequently, we refer to the generic formula used in studies of economic growth and 
system-GMM estimator for our empirical analysis. Our database is for the period 1970-2010. 
We conclude that the effects of social cohesion (measured by civil war) on economic growth 
and on β-convergence rate are influenced by country size, and the negative effect is higher in 
large states. 
This paper is structured as follows: the second section provides a review of the literature 
and some stylized facts; the third section presents the methodology, the model and the 
database; the fourth section presents the empirical results and discussion; and finally, the fifth 
section is dedicated to the conclusion. 
 
2 – AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 – Country Size 
We found several criteria used to define country size, such as population, land area, 
total GDP or external trade, but there is no consensus about the best and most complete 
criteria to be applied. However, population size is the most common. According to Read 
(2001), the common use of population as a criterion to define countries size is due to the wide 
availability of the data and the easy way that the limits can be established. However, we did 
not find any authors that present theoretical or statistical justification for the use of a certain 
limit. 
The population size used to define small states has been varying over time. In the 70s 
and 80s it was 5 million (Jalan, 1982), in the 90s and the first decade of this century it was 1.5 
million (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997) and 3 million (Armstrong et al., 1998). Some 
authors criticize the use of the population as a measure of country size. Read (2001) critiqued 
the use of the population, because it is a continuous variable and there is no theoretical natural 
reason to explain the arbitrary choice of a structural limit. 
We found some studies that define the countries through a combination of population, 
land area and GDP. Crowards (2002) defined small sates with: population – 2.7 million; area 
– 40,000 km2; and, GDP – $ 2,500 million. Thorhallsson (2006) defines "micro" states as 
correspond to states with military expenditure lower than 400 million US dollars. There are 
others studies that define country size by external trade. Davenport (2001) classifies small 
states are those with exports less than 0.03% of world trade. 
In this paper we define countries sizes by a combination of land area and total 
population. We used cluster analysis to classify the countries according to the size of 
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population and land area.1 Some studies in this subject use the combination of population, 
land area and GDP to classify countries. In our case we did not consider the GDP because this 
variable could also serve as an indicator of the country's level of development. Moreover, the 
object of our research is small states and not states with small economic size.  
We used the data of 2009 for 215 states and we set up two groups of states, a group with 
83 small states (we can consider 45 as “small” and 38 as "micro") and the other with 132 
large states (we can consider 127 as “medium” and 5 as “large”).2 
 
2.2 – Some Characteristics of Small States 
The theoretical literature suggests several factors that can explain the economic growth 
of a country as a result of their size. Since this study focuses on small states, we will describe 
the benefits and constraints of small country size. In dichotomous terms, some of these 
constraints/benefits can be seen as a benefits/constrains to large states:  
1) High per capita cost of some goods and services due to small population – this high 
cost is explained by indivisibility of the cost of various public goods and services and the 
political costs. This indivisibility is indicated as a barrier to international competitiveness of 
small states (Briguglio, 1995). 
2) Small domestic market – the small domestic market does not support multiple 
companies producing the same goods and services, thus, the economic structure is less 
diversified in small states (Briguglio, 1995). Small size of the market (in terms of land area 
and population) may lead to less diversification of raw materials and resources, which 
restricts domestic production (Castello and Ozawa, 1999). These characteristics imply that 
small states have strong geographic concentration of exports and limited diversification of 
production and exports, which increase the exposure to external shocks. The small domestic 
market leads the country to a high level of openness to external trade, which also increases 
exposure to external shock. 
3) Difficulties to access the capital markets – the private financial markets identifies 
small countries as having greater risk than large countries due to vulnerability and the trend to 
weak growth in the long term. Thus, the spreads are high and the access to funding is more 
difficult for small countries. This results in high external debt and financing costs (Eckaus 
1995; Armstrong and Read, 2003; Commonwealth, 2014). Nonetheless, Srinivasan (1985) 
and Bray (1992) found that small countries receive net official transfers per capita and in 
terms of weight in budget support higher than large countries, which helps to mitigate the 
difficulty to access the foreign financial markets. 
4) High environmental, economic, social and political vulnerability – the environmental 
vulnerability is due to the location of countries (small and large) in areas subject to these 
disasters. However, the greater vulnerability of small states, according to Briguglio (1995), is 
due to the disproportionate effect (in terms of unit area and per capita cost) that a disaster of 
                                                            
1 There are various techniques, methods and measures that can be applied in the clusters analysis, depending on 
the type of data and the purpose of the study. For our study, because the number of objects is reduce, we used the 
hierarchical technique (which is the most appropriate for reduce objects), the measure Squared Euclidean 
Distance and the method Average Linkage Between Groups. The statistical program used to do the calculations 
was SPSS 17.0. 
2 The group of countries is in the appendix. Even considering a more recent data of population and land area 
there is no change in the country groups classification. 
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the same intensity may have in a small state compared with a large state. The economic 
vulnerability of small states according to Armstrong and Read (2003), is explained by the 
high degree of external trade, small domestic market, high per capita cost of certain goods and 
services, export concentration and little diversification of production. Downes and Mamingi 
(2001) link the social vulnerability of small states to their inability to withstand external 
cultures and social influences which have proven to be very costly in financial and human 
terms for these states. Political vulnerability results from direct or indirect dependence of 
small states on political intentions of large and powerful countries, in terms of trade and other 
assistance (Castello and Ozawa, 1999; Downes and Mamingi, 2001). 
5) Strong social cohesion – Castello and Ozawa (1999) consider small states more open 
to changes, extremely adaptable and flexible to new challenges, with greater political 
integration and better prepared to face uncertainties and external shocks, due to the prevalence 
of greater solidarity and social cohesion. According to Bray (1992) and Castello and Ozawa 
(1999), small countries tend to develop a very integrated society and with a very complex 
relationship network due to reduced geographical distance and higher frequency of face-to-
face contact. This allows to a high degree of communication and efficient flow of information 
between government and companies, which is important to strengthen the relationship 
between the two sectors. These behaviours have a positive impact on economic growth 
(Armstrong and Read, 2003).  
Homogeneity of population – Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Alesina (2003) argue 
that larger population may involve less homogeneity, because the cultural differences has a 
positive correlation with country size. This implies that the public choices are close to the 
average individual’s preferences in a small state. The stability of many national governments 
has been threatened by serious domestic conflicts associated with racial, religious and 
linguistic diversity. Hence, greater social homogeneity is conducive to a more stable 
government. 
We conclude that the difficulty to taking advantage of the economies of scale in various 
economic activities seems to be the main constraints associated with small countries. 
However, Backus et al. (1992) observe that there is not a strong connection between GDP per 
capita and measures of scale effects. On the other hand, the strong social cohesion is indicated 
as the main benefit associated with the small country size. But, Briguglio (1995) argues that 
this greater cohesion in small states can create administrative problems, in the sense that 
people know each other well and are related very often. This may compromise impartiality 
and efficiency in public administration by for example interfering with the promotion and 
recruitment of the workforce, which should be based on merit. 
 
2.3 – Social Cohesion and economic growth 
We found several definition of social cohesion. Easterly et al. (2006) defines social 
cohesion as the nature and extent of social and economic divisions within a society. These 
divisions may be by income, race, political party, social class, language or other demographic 
variables. Berger-Schmitt (2002) considers social cohesion as the strength of social 
relationships and associations, and the sense of belonging to the same community. According 
to Berger-Schmitt (2002) the concept of social cohesion covers two dimensions: i) inequality 
dimension - the goal is to promote equal opportunities and reduce disparities and divisions 
within a society. It also includes the aspect of social exclusion; ii) social capital dimension - 
the goal is to strengthen social relations, interactions and push and embraces all aspects which 
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are usually understand as the social capital of a society. Jenson (2010) defends that greater 
social cohesion leads to better institutions and better institutions leads to higher growth. 
Different measures are used as a proxy to analysis the impact of social cohesion on 
economic growth. Knack and Keefer (1997) measured social cohesion by the level of trust in 
a society, and the result was a positive and significant impact on economic growth. Easterly 
and Levine (1997) used the ethno-linguistic diversity as a proxy of social cohesion, and they 
found an inverse relationship between the proxy and economic growth. Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005) considered the proxy religious heterogeneity and the result was a negative 
effect on economic growth. 
Since the social cohesion positively influences the growth rate of GDP, the countries 
should promote social cohesion. The quality of institutions, the level of education and the 
level of income are indicated as important factors to increase the social cohesion. Heyneman 
(2000) argues that exist three ways by which education promotes social cohesion: i) provides 
public knowledge of the social contract; ii) promotes the expected behaviour relatively to 
social contracts, as a result of the social experiences that the students acquire in schools; iii) 
helps to understand the consequences of non-compliance of contracts. Alesina and Ferrara 
(2000) argue that have income successful favours the "trust" (social cohesion), because the 
professional experience of success is likely to make the individual more susceptible to trust. 
For Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) economic institutions with high quality allow broad 
access and share of economic opportunities, which reduce the inequalities and promote social 
cohesion. 
Social cohesion is indicated as one of the main benefits of small country size 
(Armstrong et al, 1998; Briguglio et al, 2006; Guillaumont, 2010).  Small countries usually 
have higher degree of social homogeneity, cohesion and identity, which facilitates the 
formation of social capital and a more fertile environment for economic growth (Armstrong 
and Read, 1998). Be part of the same country implies agreements about policies to facilitate 
governance (as: redistribution schemes, provision of public goods and foreign policies). The 
small size facilitates consensus and common involvement in decision making (Alesina, 2003). 
On the other hand, social cohesion allows more contact between members of a society, which 
favours nepotism and clientelism, which are factors that do not favour the competition in 
economic sectors. In this sense, we will empirically analyze if the impact of social cohesion 
on economic growth is influenced by the country size. 
 
2.4 – Stylized Facts 
The low population and land area are presented as the main constraints to economic 
growth of small states, since these dimensions translate into small domestic market 
(population) and natural resources (land area). In the period 1970-2010 the average annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita was statistically significantly higher in small states (2.1%) 
compared to large states (1.7%).3 The growth rate of GDP per capita was higher in small 
states during the period 1970-2005, but in the last five years (2006-2010), large states had 
higher growth performance. The average level of GDP per capita is statistically significant 
higher in small states (US$12,262) compared to large states (US$8,244) in the period 1970-
2010. Even with the elimination of the five small states (Bermuda, Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar and 
Luxembourg) with the highest average level of GDP per capita, the average level of the group 
                                                            
3 The groups of small and large states are the groups defined in this study. 
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remains higher than the group of large states.4 These facts show that the small size compared 
to large size is not a handicap to economic growth. 
Assuming the linguistic diversity index as a proxy to social cohesion, we conclude that 
the average of the index is lower in small countries comparing to large countries, and this 
difference is statistically significant at 10%. If we consider civil war as a proxy to social 
cohesion, we find that the 91 countries (10 small countries and 81 large countries) with 
information available, the average years with civil war in the period 1970-2010 is higher in 
large countries (11.33 years) compared to small countries (1.14 years).5 Thus, we conclude 
that social cohesion is superior in small countries.  
 
3 – EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
3.1 – Empirical Model 
Our empirical model follows the generic formula used in studies of economic growth, 
which includes Augmented Solow model plus other determinants of growth. Considering the 
studies of Caselli et al. (1996), Levine et al. (2000) and Aisen and Veiga (2013), this is our 
model of economic growth: 
݈݊ ௜ܻ,௧ െ ݈݊ ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ ൌ ߛ݈݊ ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߰ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߠܼ௜,௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߱௧ ൅ ߳௜,௧             (1) 
where: ݈݊ ௜ܻ,௧  – logarithm of real GDP per capita of country i at the end of period t; ௜ܺ,௧ – 
vector of basic variables;  ܼ௜,௧ – variables of interest; ߤ௜ – country individual effect; ߱௧ – 
period specific effect; ߳௜,௧ – error term; γ, ߰, and θ – parameters to be estimated; i = 1,…,N 
(represents countries); and, t = 2,…,T (period).  
Assuming ߴ ൌ 1 ൅ ߛ and ݕ௜,௧ ൌ ݈݊ ௜ܻ,௧ the equation (1) is equivalent to: 
ݕ௜,௧ ൌ ߴݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߰ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߠܼ௜,௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߱௧ ൅ ߳௜,௧     (2) 
In this dynamic model the lagged dependent variable (ݕ௜,௧ିଵ) may be correlated with the 
error term (߳௜,௧) and the individual effect (ߤ௜). Also, we have the situation of the endogenous 
variables X and Z. The use of the OLS estimator in equation (2) will be inconsistent and 
biased. First-difference of equation (2) eliminates the individual effects (which solves the 
problem of heterogeneity and thus prevents the estimator bias), as ߤ௜ െ ߤ௜ ൌ 0. The equation 
becomes:  
∆ݕ௜,௧ ൌ ߴ∆ݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߰∆ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߠ∆ܼ௜,௧ ൅ ∆߱௧ ൅ ∆߳௜,௧    (3) 
But, we still have the problem of autocorrelation, because ݕ௜,௧ିଵ term in ∆ݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൌ
ݕ௜,௧ିଵ െ ݕ௜,௧ିଶ is correlated with the ߳௜,௧ିଵ in ∆߳௜,௧ ൌ ߳௜,௧ െ ߳௜,௧ିଵ, and, on the other hand, any 
predetermined variables in X or Z that are not strictly exogenous become potentially 
endogenous because they may be related with ߳௜,௧ିଵ (Roodman, 2009b). 
Arellano and Bond (1991) indicate the use of instrumental variables in the regression of 
the first-differences equation (3) that solves the problem of autocorrelation and endogeneity. 
                                                            
4 Data source: GDP per capita are from Penn World Table - PWT 7.1.  
5 Data source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict 
Dataset, version 4 - 2011: www.ucdp.uu.se. 
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The authors propose as instruments the use of the lagged variable into two or more periods if 
it is endogenous, the use of lagged variable into one or more periods if it is predetermined, 
and the use of variable as their own instruments if it is strictly exogenous.  
The GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) estimator applied to the moment 
conditions of the equation (3) is known as First-differenced GMM (see: Arellano and Bond, 
1991). Blundell and Bond (1998) showed that the First-differenced GMM estimator may be 
biased when the value of the parameter (ϑ) is close to one. Thus, Blundell and Bond (1998) 
propose the use of system-GMM estimator which combines in one system the equation in 
first-difference (3) with the equation in levels (2) as the best estimator to solve the 
econometric problems associated with our economic model (the endogeneity of explanatory 
variable and country specific effects). For the equation in levels (2), Arellano and Bover 
(1995) suggest the use of the lagged values of the variables in first difference as valid 
instruments if the explanatory variable in level is correlated with the fixed effect (ߤ௜) and the 
first difference is not. 
Blundell and Bond (1998) presents three advantages associated with system-GMM over 
other estimation methods for dynamic panel data models: i) The estimator is not biased by the 
omission of variables that are constant over time; ii) The use of instruments allows parameters 
to be estimated consistently in models with endogenous explanatory variables; and, iii) The 
use of instruments potentially allows consistent estimation even in the presence of 
measurement error.  
We tested the consistency of the system-GMM estimator using the following tests: 
Hansen test – validity of the instrument matrix; difference-in-Hansen – validity of the subsets 
instruments; and, Arellano and Bond (1991) – independence of the error term. 
In addition to the model presented above, we will use another model in order to assess 
the statistical significance of differences between the coefficients of the variables of interest in 
small and large states. Thus, we include a third column in the table, where we have common 
data for the basic variable and the variables of interest (social cohesion) are interacted with a 
dummy variable to identify the two groups of states. The statistical significance of the 
difference between the coefficients of the interaction terms is analyzed by the Wald test. The 
model to be estimated is: 
∆ݕ௜,௧ ൌ ߴ∆ݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߰∆ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߠ∆ܼ௜,௧ ∗ ݀௅ ൅ ߣ∆ܼ௜,௧ ∗ ݀ௌ ൅ ∆߱௧ ൅ ∆߳௜,௧  (4) 
where: ݀௅ – dummy = 1 for Large states; ݀ௌ – dummy =1 for Small states. 
By the literature review we conclude that variables such as initial level of GDP per 
capita, human capital, investment and population growth display similar economic and 
statistical behaviour in relation to growth rate of GDP per capita in both small and large 
countries. Thus, we consider these variables basic to our model and are kept in all regressions. 
On the other hand, we consider civil war and ethnic tension as proxies to social cohesion (our 
variable of interest) and we will investigate empirically whether their impacts on the growth 
rate of GDP per capita are significantly different between small and large states. 
We used the econometric software STATA.12 to estimates our model. The estimates are 
made using the command "xtabond2" developed by Roodman (2009b). We use the "robust" 
option on the command "xtabond2" in all estimations, to ensure that the estimator is robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Following Roodman (2009a), in all estimations the number of instruments 
is less than the number of countries in order to prevent bias in statistical tests. 
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3.2 – Data and variables 
Our unbalanced panel data refers to the period 1970-2010 for 159 states, of which 31 
are classified as small and 128 as large states.6 The data were first considered in 5 year 
periods non-overlapping (1971-1975, 1976-1980,..., 2006-2010), but in the group of small 
states the observations are fewer and we could not have results with economic and statistical 
significance for many variables. Thus, we used the 5-year “rolling window” for all variables, 
which led to a larger number of observations.7  
The “rolling windows” technique allows for a greater number of observations. 
However, it can create autocorrelation. To overcome the problem of autocorrelation and 
endogeneity we had to use more lags. So, to limit instrument proliferation, we follow 
Roodman (2009a and 2009b) and used the “collapse” option, available with the command 
“xtabond2” in STATA program.8 This option generates one instrument for each variable and 
lag distance, instead of one for each time period, variable, and lag distance. The “rolling 
windows” technique can also generate multicollinearity of the regressors. We used the 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) test to detect the collinearity of the regressors. Also, we 
tested all estimations for sensitivity to reduction in the number of instruments. 
Our main data source is the PWT 7.1. Although there is a new version, the PWT 8.0, we 
chose the PWT 7.1 because it contains more data on the group of countries identified as small 
in our study. The variables were considered endogenous. The variables of the model are: 
 Initial GDPpc (log) (PWT) – Logarithm of real GDP per capita (PPC, I$, 2005) 
lagged by 5 year period. A negative coefficient is expected. 
 Invest. (% GDP) (PWT) – Average investment (% GDP) over the current 5 year 
period. A positive coefficient is expected. 
 Secondary (%) (World Development Indicators - WDI) – Average of secondary 
school enrolment rate over the current 5 year period. This is a proxy for the level of 
human capital. A positive coefficient is expected. 
 POP_gr (%) (PWT) – Average of population growth rate over the current 5 year 
period. A negative coefficient is expected. 
 Civil war – Refers to the year in which a country had situations of ethnic or civil 
war or civil violence. A dummy is used and is equals to 1 if there was civil war 
during the year. The period considered is 1970-2010. A negative coefficient is 
expected.9  
 Index of ethnic tension – Measures the degree of tension within a country caused 
by racial, nationalities and languages divisions. The index ranges between 0 and 6, 
where low ratings correspond to countries with higher tension. The period 
considered is 1984-2010. A positive coefficient is expected, because lower tension 
means greater social cohesion.10 
                                                            
6 The table with data is on appendix. 
7 Example of studies that used rolling window: Barrell and Gottschalk (2004) and Klomp and de Haan (2009). 
8 The “collapse” option makes this transformation of the instrument matrix (Roodman, 2009b): 
From: 
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ 0 0 0 0 0 0 …ݕ௜,ଵ 0 0 0 0 0 …
0 ݕ௜,ଶ ݕ௜,ଵ 0 0 0 …
0 0 0 ݕ௜,ଷ ݕ௜,ଶ ݕ௜,ଵ …
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
 to : 
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ 0 0 0 …ݕ௜,ଵ 0 0 …
ݕ௜,ଶ ݕ௜,ଵ 0 …ݕ௜,ଷ ݕ௜,ଶ ݕ௜,ଵ …
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
 
9 Data source: Marshall, M. C. (2013) Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions. 
Center for Systemic Peace: www.systemicpeace.org. 
10 Data source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG): https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-
methodologies/icrg. 
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 Time dummy – We divide the period of analysis into 5 year periods, non-
overlapping, and we assume each period as a time dummy.  
 
4 – EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
4.1 – Social Cohesion and Economic Growth 
In table 1, the variables of interest (index of ethnic tension and civil war) have the 
expected behaviour. The basic variables have the expected signals and most are statistically 
significant. Initial GDP per capita has a negative and statistically significant coefficient in all 
estimations of the two groups. Investment (% GDP) and Secondary (% GDP) have positive 
impacts in all estimations of the two groups and most of the effects are statistically 
significant. The population growth coefficient is negative and statistically significant in 
almost all estimations.   
On the estimation with the ethnic tension (column 2), in order to avoid that the number 
of instruments exceeds the number of countries, we did not consider time dummies, due to the 
shortage number of observations for small countries. We considered time dummies in the 
remaining estimations, but the coefficients are not included in the tables in order to save 
space. The Hansen test did not reject the validity of the instruments used, the autocorrelation 
test rejects second-order autocorrelation, the difference-in-Hansen test did not reject the 
validity of the subsets of instruments and the VIF test does not show the existence of 
multicollinearity. Therefore, these tests support the validity of our results.11  
The coefficients of the variable index of ethnic tension are positive and statistical 
significance in both groups of countries (columns 1 and 2) and the coefficient is higher in the 
group of small countries (column 2). The result was expected because small countries are 
characterized by higher social cohesion. By the estimation to compare the coefficients 
between the two groups of countries, we found that the index of ethnic tension has a positive 
and statistically significant impact in the two groups of countries (column 5). The coefficient 
still higher in small countries, but the Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis of equality 
of the coefficients. 12 
The variable civil war has a negative effect in small countries, but is not statistically 
significant (column 4). Doing the estimation to compare the coefficients between the two 
groups of countries (column 6), the variable continues not statistically significant, but the 
effect become positive in small countries. On large countries, civil war has negative and 
statistically significant impact (columns 3 and 6). So, we conclude that civil war seems to 
have uncertain effect on small countries, however, in neither case is statistically significant. 
But in the large countries the effect is negative and statistically significant. This lack of 
statistical significance of the civil war in small countries may be explained by the reduced 
period of civil war in small countries.  
Thus, we conclude that the lack of social cohesion has a negative effect on growth rate 
of GDP per capita. The effect of social cohesion (when is measured by civil war) on growth 
rate of GDP per capita is influenced by country size and the negative impact is superior in 
                                                            
11 The results of the VIF test are in appendix (table A.3). There is evidence of multicollinearity if: i) The largest 
VIF is greater than 10 (some choose a more conservative threshold value of 30); ii) The mean of all the VIFs is 
considerably larger than 1. 
12 Wald test: chi2(1) = 0.14; Prob > chi2 = 0.7062 - Accept the null hypothesis of equal coefficients. 
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large countries. This result is consistent with the conclusion of the stylized facts previously 
analyzed, where we verify that small countries have higher social cohesion.  
Table 1: Social Cohesion and Economic Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) 
Variables GDPgr_L GDPgr_S GDPgr_L GDPgr_S GDPgr_T GDPgr_T 
Initial GDPpc (log) -0.0532*** -0.0353* -0.0302** -0.0873*** -0.0548*** -0.0345*** 
 (-4.094) (-1.879) (-2.193) (-3.830) (-5.114) (-3.945) 
POP_gr (%) 0.196 -1.842*** -0.661 -1.018** 0.178 0.286 
 (0.105) (-3.699) (-0.914) (-2.481) (0.153) (0.390) 
Invest. (% GDP) 0.000684 0.00214 0.000806* 0.00348** 0.00119 0.000922 
 (0.859) (0.933) (1.747) (2.454) (1.042) (1.288) 
Secondary (%) 0.00168*** 0.00142 0.00108** 0.00198* 0.00145** 0.00129*** 
 (2.648) (0.909) (2.178) (1.847) (2.365) (4.022) 
Index ethnic tension 0.00874* 0.0514**     
 (1.670) (2.269)     
Dummy civil war   -0.0169* -0.0406   
   (-1.744) (-0.824)   
Index ethnic tension_L     0.0281**  
     (2.283)  
Index ethnic tension_S     0.0304***  
     (2.738)  
Dummy civil war_L      -0.0335* 
      (-1.845) 
Dummy civil war_S      0.0900 
      (1.385) 
       
Nº observations 2,579 488 4,145 863 3,067 5,008 
Nº Countries  113 23 128 31 136 159 
Nº instruments 51 20 113 28 30 110 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.111 0.330 0.252 0.229 0.433 0.311 
AR1 test (p-value) 0.643 0.0944 0.694 0.862 0.138 0.261 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.421 0.774 0.892 0.774 0.136 0.874 
       
Difference-in-Hansen 
tests (p-value) 
      
Instruments level 0.182 0.830 0.658 0.345 0.909 0.203 
Time Dummies  0.651  0.170 0.302 0.147 0.488 
Notes: The dependent variable is growth rate of GDP per capita (GDP_gr). Meaning of acronyms: _L – group of 
Large states, _S – group of Small states, _T – Total states. t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level to 
reject the null hypothesis: *** - 1%, ** - 5% e * - 10%.  
 
4.1.1 – Sensitivity analysis 
We checked the robustness of our conclusion about the difference between the 
coefficients of the variables of interest across the two groups of countries by doing a 
sensitivity analysis of our results. First, we used other criteria to classify the countries in 
clusters, by considering separately total GDP, total population and total land area to define the 
clusters. Also, a limit of 3 million was used to define small countries (following Armstrong et 
al., 1998), but the results were identical to those obtained with the use of the total population 
variable to define the clusters, so we do not present these estimations. Second, we controlled 
the sample by excluding high income states, low income states and member states of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) plus other states considered 
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petroleum exporters by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).13 
Third, we eliminated the first and last 10 years of our database, forming two sub-periods, 
1970-2000 and 1980-2010. Finally, we eliminated some states with population and land area 
outliers in each group.14 The tables with the estimation results are in the appendix (tables A.4 
and A.5). 
Due to limited observations available, we did not consider the sub-period 1970-2000 for 
the estimation with index of ethnic tension. In all estimations, the index of ethnic tension has 
positive and statistically significant coefficients in both groups of countries, and the 
differences between the coefficients are not statistically significant by Wald test. The variable 
civil war has no statistical significance in the group of small countries and in the group of 
large countries, the coefficients are negative and most statistically significant. This finding is 
consistent with that obtained above. All regressions passed the specification tests of Hansen, 
autocorrelation and difference-in-Hansen, and the VIF test does not show the existence of 
multicollinearity. Hence, our findings are robust to changes in the criteria used to classify the 
countries, the country income level, the removal of outliers and the sample period used. 
 
4.2 – β-convergence  
In this subsection we analyze the impact of social cohesion in the β-convergence rate 
across the countries of each group. The neoclassical model defend diminishing returns to 
capital, so if two economies have the same preferences and technologies, poorer economies 
typically grow faster and tend to catch up to the richer economies (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1992). The concept of β-convergence is divided into absolute (unconditioned) and 
conditional. Absolute convergence means that poor country grows faster than rich country 
and in the long run achieves the same steady state. In this situation, it is not considered the 
influence of structural variables on econometric estimation. Conditional convergence means 
that countries converge to different steady states, and it is considered the influence of 
structural variables on econometric estimation. We will analyse conditional convergence. 
 
4.2.1 – The model 
Considering the neoclassical model defined in the studies of Solow (1956), Mankiw et 
al. (1992) and Islam (1995): 
݈݋݃൫ ෠ܻ௧൯ െ ݈݋݃൫ ෠ܻ௧଴൯ ൌ ൫1 െ ݁ିఉ்൯݈݋݃൫ ෠ܻ∗൯ െ ൫1 െ ݁ିఉ்൯݈݋݃൫ ෠ܻ௧଴൯   (5) 
where: ෠்ܻ  – GDP per effective unit of labour at time t; ෠ܻ௧଴ – GDP per effective worker at 
some initial date; ෠ܻ ∗ – steady-state level of GDP per effective worker; ߚ – convergence rate; 
ߚ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߮ሻሺ݊ ൅ ݃ ൅ ߜሻ. 
 
 
                                                            
13 We followed the income classification of countries defined by the World Bank for the year 2010. We exclude 
18 petroleum exporting states: Angola, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, Russia, Norway, Ecuador, Gabon and Indonesia. 
14 Outlier countries: Small States (Hong Kong, Singapore, Moldavia, Lebanon, Puerto Rico, Guyana, Suriname, 
Iceland and Latvia); Large States (China, United States, Indonesia, Russia, Brazil, Canada and Australia). 
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A conventional representation of the growth model in panel data for our estimation is 
given by: 
݈݋݃ ൬௬೔,೅௬೔,೟బ൰ ൌ ߛ݈݋݃൫ݕ௜,௧బ൯ ൅ ߰ ௜ܺ,் ൅ ߠܼ௜,் ൅ ߣ൫ܼ௜,் ∗ ݈݋݃ݕ௜,௧బ൯ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ்߱ ൅ ߳௜,் (6) 
where: ݕ௜,் – GDP per capita of country i at time T; ݕ௜,௧బ – GDP per capita of country i at 
initial date; ௜ܺ,் – vector of basic variables;  ܼ௜,் – variables of interest; ߤ௜ – country 
individual effect; ்߱ – period specific effect; ߳௜,் – error term; γ, ߰, ߣ  and θ – parameters to 
be estimated. 
In the neoclassical growth model the existence of convergence implies that the γ 
coefficient is negative. Considering ߛ ൌ െ൫1 െ ݁ିఉ்൯, applying logarithms, we have:	ܶβ ൌ
െ lnሺ1 ൅ ߛሻ and dividing by T, we have annual convergence rate:	β ൌ െ ୪୬ሺଵାఊሻ் . 
The derivative of equation (6) with respect to initial GDP per capita (ݕ௜,௧బ) gives the 
impact of the variables of interest in the convergence rate: 
డ∆௬೔,೅
డ∆௬೔,೟బ
ൌ ߛ ൅ ߣܼ௜,்          (7) 
 
4.2.2 – Empirical results and analysis 
The basic variables and the variable of interest have the same sources and period of 
analysis used previously. The data are in a 5 year “rolling window” and we use the system-
GMM to estimate our model. 
The results are reported in table 2. Initial GDP per capita has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient in all regressions, which means existence of conditional convergence 
across countries of each group. Most of the variables have the expected coefficients signals 
and are statistically significant. The Hansen test never rejects the validity of the instruments 
matrix, the autocorrelation test always rejects the existence of a second order autocorrelation 
and the difference-in-Hansen test never rejects the validity of the subsets of instruments, so 
these tests support the validity of the results. 
We focus our analysis on the effect of the interaction term of initial GDP per capita with 
the proxies of social cohesion on β-convergence rate and in comparing the coefficients of 
interaction term between the two groups of states. The interaction terms with index of ethnic 
tension (columns 1 and 2) have a negative effects and not statistically significant in both 
groups of countries. Comparing the two coefficients (column 5) we see that the impact 
remains negative and not statistically significant. The interaction terms with civil war 
(columns 3 and 4) has the expected effects, positive, but is not statistically significant. The 
estimation to compare the coefficients of interaction term between the two groups of countries 
(column 6) indicated a positive coefficient, as expected, but is statistically significant only in 
large states. Thus, lack of social cohesion (measured by civil wars) seems to contribute 
statistically significant for the reduction of β-convergence rate only in larges states. But when 
the social cohesion is measured by index of ethnic tension the effect in the β-convergence rate 
is not statistically significant in both groups.  
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Table 2: β-convergence – Social Cohesion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables GDPgr_L GDPgr_S GDPgr_L GDPgr_S GDPgr_T GDPgr_T 
Initial GDPpc (log) -0.0505** -0.0215* -0.0455*** -0.0177* -0.0327* -0.0219** 
 (-2.103) (-1.652) (-4.089) (-1.682) (-1.663) (-2.266) 
Secondary (%) 0.0023*** 0.00196 0.00157*** 0.00198 0.0016*** 0.000620 
 (3.264) (1.171) (3.334) (1.515) (3.651) (1.637) 
POP_gr  1.275 -1.252 0.350 1.418 0.556 0.921 
 (0.759) (-1.023) (0.286) (0.770) (0.820) (1.076) 
Invest. (% GDP) 0.00177* -0.000258 0.00167* 0.00156 0.000688 2.45e-05 
 (1.658) (-0.283) (1.773) (0.755) (0.744) (0.0427) 
Index ethnic tension 0.0191 0.0832*   0.00716  
 (0.325) (1.660)   (0.146)  
Ethnic tension*GDPpc -0.00297 -0.00632     
  (-0.473) (-1.206)     
Dummy civil war   -0.0993 1.489  -0.425* 
   (-0.478) (1.453)  (-1.669) 
Civil war*GDPpc   0.00910 0.130   
   (0.343) (1.554)   
Ethnic tension*GDPpc _L     -0.00113  
     (-0.209)  
Ethnic tension*GDPpc _S     -0.000373  
     (-0.0698)  
Civil war*GDPpc _L      0.0569* 
      (1.681) 
Civil war*GDPpc _S      0.0382 
      (1.255) 
       
Nº observations 2,579 488 4,145 863 3,067 5,008 
Nº Countries  113 23 128 31 136 159 
Nº instruments 90 18 80 26 112 145 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.139 0.345 0.157 0.796 0.132 0.326 
AR1 test (p-value) 0.373 0.0648 0.790 0.447 0.208 0.0512 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.248 0.784 0.548 0.920 0.530 0.592 
       
Difference-in-Hansen tests 
(p-value) 
      
Instruments level 0.339 0.907 0.224 0.631 0.722 0.758 
Time Dummies  0.898  0.273 0.733 0.859 0.800 
Notes: The dependent variable is growth rate of GDP per capita (GDP_gr). Meaning of acronyms: _L – group 
of Large states, _S – group of Small states, _T – Total states. t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level to 
reject the null hypothesis: *** - 1%, ** - 5% e * - 10%.  
 
 
5 – CONCLUSION  
Some studies identify a small country size as a major impediment to the economic 
growth process. We conclude that the difficulty to taking advantage of the economies of scale 
in various economic activities seems to be the main disadvantage associated with small 
countries. The great social cohesion is indicated as the main benefit link to small states. 
Following the analysis of some stylized facts we conclude that small size is not a handicap to 
economic growth and social cohesion is statistically significant higher in small countries.  
We used land area and population size to divide the countries in two groups, small and 
large. We considered 215 countries, of which 83 was classified as small states and 132 as 
large states. We empirically analysed the impact of social cohesion on the growth rate of GDP 
per capita of these two groups of countries. The effects of social cohesion were analysed 
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using the variables civil war and index of ethnic tension. Overall, we conclude that the effect 
of social cohesion on growth of GDP per capita is positive and statistically significant in both 
groups of countries. This result is robust to changes in the criteria used to classify the 
countries, the country income level, the removal of outliers and the sample period used. In 
particular, when the effect of social cohesion in growth rate of GDP per capita and β-
convergence rate is measured by index of ethnic tension the difference between the 
coefficients of the two groups of countries is not statistically significant. But, when we use the 
variable civil war, the negative impact in growth rate of GDP per capita and the contribution 
in reducing the β-convergence rate is statistically significant higher in large states.  
 Many studies consider social cohesion as the main vantage of small countries 
(Armstrong et al, 1998; Briguglio et al, 2006) and others found a positive impact of social 
cohesion in growth rate of GDP per capita (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol, 2005). We conclude also that social cohesion has positive effects in economic growth, 
and when the social cohesion is measured by civil war, the negative effect is higher in large 
states. Since the social cohesion contributes to increase the growth rate of GDP per capita and 
the β-convergence rate, we suggest the improvement of the quality of economic institutions, 
the level of education and the level of income to strengthen the social cohesion. 
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APPENDIX  
Table A.1 – Groups of countries 
Small States 
Albania Curacao Iceland Mayotte Solomon Islands 
American Samoa Cyprus Isle of Man Micronesia, Fed. Sts. St. Kitts and Nevis 
Andorra Djibouti Jamaica Moldova St. Lucia 
Antigua & Barbuda Dominica Kiribati Monaco St. Martin  
Armenia Equatorial Guinea Kosovo Montenegro St. Vincent & the Grenadines
Aruba Estonia Kuwait New Caledonia Suriname 
Bahamas, The Faeroe Islands Latvia Northern Mariana  Swaziland 
Bahrain Fiji Lebanon Palau Timor-Leste 
Barbados French Polynesia Lesotho Puerto Rico Tonga 
Belize Gambia, The Liechtenstein Qatar Trinidad &Tobago 
Bermuda Gibraltar Luxembourg Samoa Turks & Caicos Islands 
Bhutan Greenland Macao  San Marino Tuvalu 
Brunei Darussalam Grenada Macedonia, FYR S. T. & Principe Vanuatu 
Cape Verde Guam Maldives Seychelles Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
Cayman Islands Guinea-Bissau Malta Singapore West Bank & Gaza 
Channel Islands Guyana Marshall Islands Sint Maarten   
Comoros Hong Kong Mauritius Slovenia  
 
Large States 
Afghanistan Congo, Rep. Iran Nepal Sri Lanka 
Algeria Costa Rica Iraq Netherlands Sudan 
Angola Cote d'Ivoire Ireland New Zealand Sweden 
Argentina Croatia Israel Nicaragua Switzerland 
Australia Cuba Italy Niger Syrian Arab Republic 
Austria Czech Republic Japan Nigeria Tajikistan 
Azerbaijan Denmark Jordan Norway Tanzania 
Bangladesh Dominican Republic Kazakhstan Oman Thailand 
Belarus Ecuador Kenya Pakistan Togo 
Belgium Egypt Korea, Dem. Rep. Panama Tunisia 
Benin El Salvador Korea, Rep. Papua New Guinea Turkey 
Bolivia Eritrea Kyrgyz Republic Paraguay Turkmenistan 
Bosnia & Herzegovina Ethiopia Lao PDR Peru Uganda 
Botswana Finland Liberia Philippines Ukraine 
Brazil France Libya Poland United Arab Emirates 
Bulgaria Gabon Lithuania Portugal United Kingdom 
Burkina Faso Georgia Madagascar Romania United States 
Burundi Germany Malawi Russian Federation Uruguay 
Cambodia Ghana Malaysia Rwanda Uzbekistan 
Cameroon Greece Mali Saudi Arabia Venezuela, RB 
Canada Guatemala Mauritania Senegal Vietnam 
Central African Rep. Guinea Mexico Serbia Yemen, Rep. 
Chad Haiti Mongolia Sierra Leone Zambia 
Chile Honduras Morocco Slovak Republic Zimbabwe 
China Hungary Mozambique Somalia  
Colombia India Myanmar South Africa  
Congo, Dem. Rep. Indonesia Namibia Spain  
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Table A.2 – Statistics data 
Large states 
Variables Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita (log) 4978 8.222086 1.32276 5.080144 11.09557 
GDP per capita (growth) 4830 0.0144257 0.0318562 -0.2979097 0.2464264 
Population (growth) 5412 0.0147749 0.0113374 -0.0532828 0.1194897 
Investment (% GDP) 4978 21.56081 9.525715 0.6920165 66.37524 
Secondary school enrolment (%) 4498 55.1768 34.97741 0.18163 156.5211 
Index ethnic tension  2938 3.899609 1.42263 0 6 
Dummy civil war  4973 0 1 
Notes: Data in 5 year period, rolling Windows, from 1970 to 2010, for 127 large states. 
 
 
Small states 
Variables Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita (log) 2168 8.785968 1.153771 6.118179 11.82269 
GDP per capita (growth) 2008 0.0176938 0.0381922 -0.2398716 0.3633565 
Population (growth) 2378 0.0124913 0.0135348 -0.1391962 0.1140619 
Investment (% GDP) 2168 26.92532 12.52897 2.14892 75.86247 
Secondary school enrolment (%) 1825 63.79278 31.38732 1.88067 164.5947 
Index ethnic tension  561 4.032204 1.389938 0 6 
Dummy civil war  1079 0 1 
Notes: Data in 5 year period, rolling Windows, from 1970 to 2010, for 54 small states. 
 
 
Table A.3 – VIF test 
Variables Civil war Index ethnic tension VIF_L VIF_S VIF_T VIF_L VIF_S VIF_T 
Initial GDPpc (log) 3.71 2.42 3.40 4.08 2.04 3.80 
Secondary (%) 5.00 3.33 4.53 5.12 2.24 4.51 
POP_gr (%) 1.80 1.22 1.51 1.99 1.11 1.53 
Invest. (% GDP) 1.17 1.06 1.12 1.14 1.11 1.11 
Dummy civil war 1.12 1.07     
Dummy civil war_L   1.11    
Dummy civil war_S   1.02    
Index ethnic tension    1.42 1.50  
Index ethnic tension_L      2.52 
Index ethnic tension_S      2.66 
Dummy (1976-1980) 1.89 2.54 1.96    
Dummy (1981-1985) 1.90 2.65 1.97    
Dummy (1986-1990) 1.95 2.61 2.01 1.32  3.20 
Dummy (1991-1995) 2.01 2.67 2.06 1.71  3.23 
Dummy (1996-2000) 2.10 3.11 2.20 1.66  3.39 
Dummy (2001-2005) 2.22 3.43 2.34 1.63  3.60 
Dummy (2006-2010) 2.28 3.59 2.41 1.62  3.64 
Mean VIF 2.26 2.47 2.13 2.17 1.61 3.02 
Note: Meaning of acronyms: _L – group of Large states, _S – group of Small states, _T – Total states 
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Table A.4: Sensitivity analysis (I) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Cluster 
GDP 
Cluster 
GDP 
Cluster 
POP 
Cluster 
POP 
Cluster 
 Area 
Cluster 
 Area 
Period 
(1970-
2000) 
Period 
(1980-
2010) 
Period 
(1980-
2010) 
Variáveis GDPgr_T GDPgr_T GDPgr_T GDPgr_T GDPgr_T GDPgr_T GDPgr_T GDPgr_T GDPgr_T 
Initial GDPpc (log) -0.0558*** -0.0213*** -0.0532*** -0.0291*** -0.0525*** -0.0396*** -0.0288** -0.0548*** -0.0497*** 
 (-4.858) (-2.581) (-4.423) (-3.965) (-4.532) (-4.271) (-2.235) (-5.114) (-4.101) 
Secondary (%) 0.00144* 0.000756* 0.0023*** 0.0011*** 0.0023*** 0.0016*** 0.000832* 0.00145** 0.0020*** 
 (1.861) (1.696) (4.581) (3.018) (4.344) (5.041) (1.886) (2.365) (3.876) 
POP_gr (%) 0.165 0.0405 0.764 0.236 0.551 0.452 0.411 0.178 1.501 
 (0.112) (0.0566) (0.677) (0.314) (0.522) (0.644) (0.733) (0.153) (1.314) 
Invest. (% GDP) 0.00129 0.000659 -0.000135 0.000601 -0.000318 0.000793 0.00178** 0.00119 0.00234** 
 (1.025) (1.012) (-0.141) (0.966) (-0.323) (1.072) (2.103) (1.042) (2.567) 
Index ethnic tension_L 0.0295**  0.0113*  0.0121**   0.0304***  
 (2.170)  (1.877)  (2.106)   (2.738)  
Index ethnic tension_S 0.0320**  0.0156*  0.0180**   0.0281**  
 (2.264)  (1.674)  (2.304)   (2.283)  
Dummy civil war_L  -0.0323*  -0.0356**  -0.0359* -0.0612*  -0.0125 
  (-1.913)  (-2.113)  (-1.932) (-1.707)  (-0.395) 
Dummy civil war_S  0.0161  0.00346  0.0217 -0.134  0.0820 
  (0.162)  (0.0283)  (0.638) (-0.665)  (1.224) 
          
Nº observations 3,067 5,008 3,067 5,008 3,067 5,008 3,568 3,067 4,032 
Nº Countries  136 159 136 159 136 159 154 136 159 
Nº instruments 30 110 30 110 30 110 105 30 103 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.395 0.288 0.699 0.298 0.389 0.264 0.398 0.433 0.204 
AR1 test (p-value) 0.188 0.0841 0.527 0.160 0.331 0.378 0.133 0.138 0.592 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.120 0.840 0.305 0.942 0.291 0.824 0.855 0.136 0.225 
          
Difference-in-Hansen 
tests (p-value) 
         
Instruments level 0.984 0.589 0.999 0.311 0.994 0.139 0.284 0.909 0.151 
Time Dummies  0.110 0.292 0.287 0.475 0.151 0.589 0.537 0.147 0.665 
 
 
Table A.5: Sensitivity analysis (II) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Excludes 
low income 
Excludes 
low income 
Excludes 
high income 
Excludes 
high income 
Excludes 
petroleum 
exporting 
Excludes 
petroleum 
exporting 
Excludes 
outliers 
Excludes 
outliers 
Variáveis GDPgr_T GDPgr_T GDPgr_T GDPgr_T GDPgr_T GDPgr_T GDPgr_T GDPgr_T 
Initial GDPpc (log) -0.0495*** -0.0475* -0.0864*** -0.0258* -0.0369*** -0.0332*** -0.0597*** -0.0316*** 
 (-3.584) (-1.879) (-3.431) (-1.838) (-3.055) (-4.677) (-4.123) (-4.759) 
Secondary (%) 0.00212*** 0.00111** 0.00138* 0.000955* 0.000659 0.00117*** 0.00222*** 0.00128*** 
 (4.412) (2.545) (1.814) (1.854) (1.106) (4.560) (3.251) (3.802) 
POP_gr (%) 0.857 -0.274 0.443 0.205 -1.216 -1.171*** 0.457 0.349 
 (0.822) (-0.370) (0.271) (0.229) (-0.843) (-3.794) (0.387) (0.544) 
Invest. (% GDP) -0.000517 0.000980* 0.00224 0.000125 0.00127 0.00118*** 0.000657 0.000449 
 (-0.502) (1.705) (1.561) (0.215) (1.454) (4.024) (0.529) (0.632) 
Index ethnic tension_L 0.0106*  0.0426***  0.0218*  0.00850*  
 (1.686)  (3.380)  (1.957)  (1.820)  
Index ethnic tension_S 0.0183**  0.0340**  0.0236**  0.0156**  
 (2.060)  (2.527)  (2.200)  (2.243)  
Dummy civil war_L  -0.00197  -0.0280*  -0.0120*  -0.0454*** 
  (-0.234)  (-1.694)  (-1.746)  (-2.910) 
Dummy civil war_S  0.00645  0.0370  -0.0176  0.0166 
  (0.159)  (0.912)  (-0.839)  (0.271) 
         
Nº observations 2,634 3,977 1,986 3,656 2,680 4,490 2,748 4,625 
Nº Countries  115 126 91 118 118 141 121 146 
Nº instruments 30 80 30 80 42 62 42 98 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.212 0.141 0.251 0.232 0.120 0.239 0.159 0.231 
AR1 test (p-value) 0.279 0.450 0.439 0.792 0.0334 0.302 0.803 0.231 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.683 0.554 0.205 0.550 0.196 0.556 0.144 0.242 
         
Difference-in-Hansen 
tests (p-value) 
        
Instruments level 0.685 0.646 0.539 0.621 0.401 0.243 0.577 0.542 
Time Dummies  0.867 0.598 0.431 0.394 0.394 0.734 0.148 0.226 
 
